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How can donors and managers of international democracy assistance programs contribute
most effectively to the democratization of media systems? Would unbridled pluralization
of the private media sector, or strict regulation and focus on public service media con-
tribute best to democratization in post-ethnic conflict areas where ethnic stereotypes and
hate speech may dominate public discourse? This chapter blends an international rela-
tions perspective with media theory, and offers detailed recommendations for interna-
tional organizations regarding media development and regulation as well as technical
and political considerations in South Eastern Europe.
1. Introduction
The issue of assistance to promote democratic media in post-conflict countries
has become an acute concern for the Western world, with recent large-scale inter-
ventions made by international organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Kosovo and Serbia. However, the fact that most organizations (the so-called
‘democracy assistants’) come from various countries accustomed to media models
that differ significantly has turned the process of building the Fourth Estate in the
Balkans into a gigantic experiment guided by an infinite number of theories.
Concerns about which media model may be most appropriate for this large
conflict-torn region – a US-style free market, British public service, a German
federal model – have been expressed over the past decade by international orga-
nizations in charge of media development and regulation in the Balkans.
However, these concerns have never connected with the lively debate regarding
media models in the academic community.
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1.1. Scope of the problem
Almost universally, donors tend to assume that their strategies, where they
exist, are (1) correct, and (2) that the outcomes of their undeniably admirable
efforts are destined to be positive or, in the worst case, neutral.
However, solid evidence has shown that a mistaken strategy of media devel-
opment can have disastrous long-term effects, and that inappropriate or bad tim-
ing in intervention can actually harm the process of democratic development by
slowing down the process of consolidation and, in certain cases, even facilitating
a backslide into authoritarianism or nationalist conflict.
There is currently substantial empirical and historical material to prove that
major errors have been made in the field of assistance in building democratic
media in the post-war Balkans. Some of these mistakes have been corrected while
many have been repeated, leaving external observers with a depressing feeling of
dèja-vu.
The international missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are the two
most spectacular examples of democratic intervention to date. The case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular was an entirely new experiment in the field of
media (the crucial role of which has been recognized as a result). This led virtu-
ally every large international organization such as the Office of the High
Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the European Union (EU) and others to have a stake in building the
Fourth Estate. The lack of coordination, duplication of effort, and conflict of
interest between international organizations in Bosnia slowed and often paralyzed
decision-making and media development. 
This lack of coordination was resolved (at least at the institutional level) in
the United Nations (UN) Mission in Kosovo, where four ‘pillars’ were placed
under the UN ‘umbrella’. Each ‘pillar’ had a specific set of competencies, with
media being assigned to the OSCE. Therefore inter-organizational conflicts and
competition was less of an issue, but the problem of intra-governmental strug-
gles within the same pillar sometimes stagnated decision-making. The OSCE,
the primary actor on the media scene, is composed of a staff that is normally ‘sec-
onded’ by the foreign offices of member states. Cooperating governments often
assume that ‘their’ key staff members can control media development according
to their state’s preferred model.
Thus, control over policy making often takes place through the appointment
of representatives of specific governments in powerful positions while the same
governments act as major donors in the chosen field. In the case of Kosovo, reg-
ulatory and other decisions that should by definition have been transparent such
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as the licensing of broadcasters, were often murky. Certain governments became
(in)famous for attaching political strings to their generous donations.
While such institutional problems take their toll, the lack of coordination
between the donors and the organizations in question remains the primary cause
of waste and the duplication of efforts and financial resources.
1.2. Target audience
Many of the recommendations made in this paper are directed first and fore-
most at donors rather than international organizations, and are organized along
the usual lines of democratic intervention by external actors: Assessment,
Implementation, Capacity-Building. Each of these stages is addressed in reference
to three focal concerns in emerging media: regulatory, technical and development.
The present policy proposal can be read as a supplement to an original paper
written by the Group of Media Experts1 for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo in
July 1999. While this paper attempts to fill in the details and address the pitfalls
contained in that specific document, I believe that its more general proposals
can be applied in any post-conflict country where international organizations
have been tasked with creating a free and responsible media environment.
1.3. Defining the boundaries
Some of the characteristics of a post-conflict country undergoing (an
imposed) democratic transition are as follows:
• a volatile security situation;
• the parties involved in the conflict still reside within the territory of the coun-
try;
• economic development is limited due to war or the previous regime;
• the area’s tradition of democracy is short-lived or non-existent;
• respect for human rights and the rule of law is weak;
• no tradition exists of purely private, truly free media due to hostilities and
conflict;
• the broadcasting and printing infrastructure may have been severely damaged.
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1. The report, dated June 1999, addressed to the international administration in the Balkans was pre-
pared by Mr. Mark Thompson, author of Forging War (1994), Mr. Dan De Luce from the Office of
the High Representative in Sarajevo and Dr. Regan McCarthy, head of the OSCE Media
Department in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The present policy proposal was prepared in Fall, 2001.
I will also for the moment assume (although such an assumption may be con-
troversial) that the European model of pluralism within the media is more appro-
priate for post-conflict countries than pluralism of the media. By the model of
pluralism within the media, I mean a European model of public service media
with fewer but higher quality stations whose programming is varied and address-
es different interest groups and political factions. Pluralism of the media is rep-
resented by a US free market model of numerous media outlets addressing nar-
row audiences.
With that in mind, the German model would seem to be particularly relevant
to the Balkan situation due to (1) its original external imposition by the Allied
powers after the Second World War; and (2) its overriding interest in the pro-
motion of political pluralism and the prevention of domination by any one group
(in order to exclude the possibility of the centralized abuse of media power such
as that manipulated by Hitler).
The West German model originated as a direct result of American and British
attempts to impose a BBC-style media model supervised by regional government.
This decision was intended to ensure the internal pluralism of any broadcasting
activity carried out in the country and to ensure that the regulation of such plural-
istic programming could never be centralized in the hands of the national govern-
ment.2 As a result, regulatory powers were entrusted to each of the original nine
regions or Laender. (Porter, V.—Hasselbach, S. 1991). This characteristic of the
German system meant that internal pluralism was ensured by the composition of
Regional Broadcasting Councils made up of representatives of “relevant social
groups”. This structure is distinct from the British model, which oversees broad-
casting content nationally by a single regulatory body made up of ‘independent’
appointees (“the Great and the Good”). It is also different from, for example, the
Italian system which (although now changed) provided for the division of the three
main television stations among the three most powerful political parties.
Obviously, in a country torn by ethnic strife, the regionalization of supervi-
sory power would be counter-productive. In this case, a national body which
promotes pluralism by its own composition or via strict legal constraints would
be more effective in the consolidation of a national media system and the open-
ing of political dialogue.
With regard to the question of public service broadcasting versus a free market
model, the difficult economic situation in the Balkans and the lack of stable demo-
cratic institutions, or even the rule of law in the case in Kosovo, suggests that the
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2. An attempt to do precisely this, made by Konrad Adenauer in 1959, was deemed to be unconsti-
tutional by the Constitutional Court in 1961.
public service broadcasting model could contribute to building social cohesion. A
model that ‘leads by example’ is attractive as a first step in the creation of a free
broadcast media. If a small number of regulated, internally pluralistic and profes-
sionally-advanced stations are present at the national level, subsequent market
openings should make way for established, high quality and (hopefully) responsi-
ble private broadcasters who can provide familiar alternatives to the public.
2. The state of the media in Kosovo
Sadly, many Balkan countries have either just emerged from war or are
threatened by conflict. The opportunity now exists in many territories for the
implementation of imposed rather than evolved media models emphasizing plu-
rality. The trend towards significant numbers of privately run radio and televi-
sion stations in each of these countries already represents a kind of free market
in broadcasting (Bosnia has 240 stations, Kosovo, 130). However, political dis-
course continues to focus on ethnicity and nationalism—a situation that
demands the promotion of internal pluralism. Historical events have contributed
to a lack of journalistic professionalism and a paucity of legislation governing
many aspects of media activity. Furthermore, democratic defense mechanisms
relied upon by most mature democracies tend to be in a precarious state in
Balkan countries. This means that the risk of nationalistic abuse and/or dema-
gogy is unacceptably high. Important democratic defense mechanisms include
media laws and regulation, journalistic professionalism, the relationship between
journalists and politicians, and accepted but unwritten ethical and professional
codes which regulate the media in democratic societies. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the Kosovar media after the war was
the rapid overcrowding of the print and broadcast media scene. Approximately
one year after the war there were seven Kosovo-wide daily newspapers and about
38 regularly printed newspapers. According to the OSCE Media Monitoring
database, in October 1999 there were just 24 radio stations and one television
channel. Five months later, in March of 2000, the number of indigenous radio
stations on the air had doubled and there were four ‘local’ television stations.3
While most of these limited, local, low-power and erratic radio stations were
relatively amateur, it should be noted that at the height of this media explosion,
Kosovo, a region of 2,000,000 people, had 93 FM stations run by local broad-
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3. Two of which were owned by Albanians from Albania. It should also be noted that one third of the
total stations (25 out of 93) are Serbian language stations. Three additional are Bosniak.
casters and about 60 more stations run by NGOs, KFOR or international broad-
casters such as the BBC, Deutche Welle (DW), Radio France Internationale
(RFI) and Voice of America (VOA).
An important characteristic of the local radio stations was the fact that they
almost exclusively targeted one ethnic community, ethnic Albanians.4 Thus the
Serb community had very little voice and was almost always portrayed in a neg-
ative context. Serb broadcasters acted in a similar fashion. As far as program con-
tent was concerned, most Kosovar broadcasters aired music or entertainment
rather than producing news.5 The most common practice regarding news was
the retransmission in local languages of news programs produced by foreign
broadcasters such as the BBC or DW.
It is not the aim of this paper to investigate the causes of the broadcast glut
which developed in such a small province. Nevertheless it should be noted that a
similar pattern of media development took place in other countries such as Bosnia,
with its 240 radio and television stations, and many Central and Eastern European
countries which witnessed an equally impressive outburst of enthusiasm for the
privatization of media and overall freedom of speech after 1990. It should be
emphasized, however, that virtually all media outlets in Kosovo were either entire-
ly or partially supported by foreign donors. Their assistance ranged from gener-
ous and consistent financial support including the purchase of studio or transmis-
sion equipment to professional training activities.
The scope and breadth of the problems faced by many of the newly formed
media outlets is hardly surprising, with the most significant obstacles being
financial. Most radio stations were run on cheap, basic equipment and with a
small number of young, largely untrained staff members.6 The main source of
income for most of the stations was ‘musical wishes’, i.e. song dedications
phoned in by listeners (the average cost of such a service varied from DM 0,50
to DM 1 in larger cities). This income was hardly enough to pay the salaries of
the staff, who often worked on a voluntary basis. The fact that no electricity bills
were collected and no licensing fees levied for the first year certainly helped
many of these broadcast stations survive.
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4. The only exception was Radio Kontact owned by Sonya Nicolic, a Serb woman, which broadcasts
programs in both Albanian and Serbian, but is under constant military protection for security rea-
sons. Multiethnic programming still belongs to the domain of public service media and some inter-
nationally-run broadcasters.
5. This may be due to several factors: economic (news production is more expensive, there is a need
for reporters in the field and recording equipment), lack of professionalism (anybody can air music),
fear of repercussions (there was a significant pressure from local politicians as well as possible sanc-
tions from the Temporary Media Commissioner for hate speech).
6. According to OSCE Media Monitoring Coordinator, the average age of radio journalists was 20
and for about 80 percent of them this was their first working experience in the field of media.
Apart from financial burdens, another important problem was the low level
of professionalism among Kosovar journalists.7 Opinion was mixed with fact,
hearsay was published as news, and unfounded accusations (mainly concerning
ethnic minorities) resulted at times in those accused being threatened, forced to
flee, or even killed.8 The right of reply, the presumption of innocence, or simple
verification of sources were hardly the rule in Kosovar journalism.
Though there are and have been continuous initiatives aimed at raising stan-
dards through training, the Kosovar media is largely populated by an older gen-
eration of journalists trained under communism and a younger generation not
trained at all. Problems associated with the establishment of a self-regulating
mechanism remain significant. In a post-conflict situation where democratic tra-
ditions do not exist, responsible professionalism in this field must be imported
and nurtured. Despite significant efforts by international donors, the association
of journalists in Kosovo remains weak.9
It has become axiomatic that journalism is not a profession one learns at school
but by observing older, more experienced colleagues. However, for this to work
a pool of older professionals to serve as models needs to exists. Such a pool is not
available in a region, where the journalistic profession was first limited by social-
ism and then eradicated by ten years of authoritarian rule. The exaggerated num-
ber of media outlets stretched thin the small pool of experienced senior editors
who could teach ethical journalism to a new generation of reporters.
Another extremely serious problem faced by Kosovar journalists was pressure
from local politicians regarding access and positive coverage. The OSCE con-
ducted a journalistic protection program and reported on numerous cases of the
harassment and killing of journalists. Even if direct threats were not received,
this dramatic situation created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation among
journalists attempting to act independently.
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7. The only school of journalism in Kosovo shut down during Milosevic’s regime. This left Kosovar
journalists without any possibility of learning the profession or even exercising it, since all Albanian-
speaking media were also banned. Clearly, short training programs for journalists offered by donors,
though of good quality, could not replace specialized schools or a professional working environment.
8. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_752000/752692.stm for details on
Petar Tupoljski’s case. For more such examples in the Kosovar press see Kosovar Albanian Press Dita
4 July 2000, Bota Sot 4 and 11 September 2000, Epoka e Re 25 September 2000 and numerous others
(available from Media Monitoring Division, OSCE MiK).
9. It took over 16 months for the AMK (Association of Kosovar Journalists) to issue its code of con-
duct. When the AMK developed its code of journalistic practice, it sent copies, and a cover editorial
describing the association and the rights and responsibilities of journalists to over 50 Kosovar media
outlets. According to a member of the board not one, even those belonging to AMK board members,
printed or broadcast either the code or the editorial. This does not inspire a great deal of faith. It
comes as no surprise that the Association does not put any pressure on their unprofessional colleagues.
3. The role of donors in the development of the Kosovo media: 
possible unintended outcomes
As mentioned, the impressive vitality of the media scene in Kosovo would not
be possible if it were not for the economic and technical support of foreign
donors. Paradoxically, numerical pluralism of the media in Kosovo occurred
largely by default. While the primary aim of some donors was to build numer-
ous commercial radio and television stations in the province (pluralism of the
media), others who strove to establish a public service media model ended up
unintentionally doing the same – creating more media, but with a public service
orientation.
What can possibly be wrong about supporting a vigorous media scene in
newly democratizing, post-conflict areas? In the eyes of many donors, the worst
that can possibly happen is that as a consequence of healthy commercial compe-
tition, some outlets will ‘make it’, while others will not. The only preoccupation
seems to be financial. Most donors simply assume that once released from the
state monopoly and the shackles of authoritarian control, legal and ethical norms
that regulate the media and protect journalists, and standards that require objec-
tive reporting, will compel broadcasters to provide balanced coverage to differ-
ent political viewpoints and will spontaneously govern the relationship between
journalists, politicians, and the public.
4. The dangers of unregulated media
While absolute freedom of the press, liberalization of the media, and media
pluralism are often dogmatically considered to be necessary conditions for
democratization (with pluralism of the media established by default), I will
argue that promoting the unconditional freedom of public debate in the deli-
cate phase of democratic transition and consolidation could spark chaos and a
reversal into autocratic regimes, precipitation of nationalistic conflict or, in
countries where nationalism is not an issue, significantly slow down the process
of democratization and adversely affect its quality. The delicate phase of demo-
cratic consolidation is characterized by insecurity and an ever-present danger
of reversal to previous regime practices; these are good reasons for this period
to be carefully regulated.10 The lack of defense mechanisms generally found in
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10. It should be pointed out that this is the period in which democratic assistance is most efficient
and needed.
democratic institutions, especially those related to the media, creates a greater
risk of backlash.
An emblematic model is one posited by Linz and Stepan, in which a modern
consolidated democracy is segmented into five ‘arenas’: political society, rule of
law, state apparatus, economic society, and civil society including the press (Linz
& Stepan 1996, p. 14). Each arena provides checks and requires support from the
other arenas if all are healthy and functional.11 The idea that the state apparatus
would limit civil society, whose primary organizing principle according to Linz
and Stepan is freedom of association and communication, would seem at odds
with the end goal of a democratic society. This regulation, however, is not an
indication of antidemocratic action by the state, but is rather a product of the need
to mend dysfunctions in civil and economic society. Freedom of association and
expression, essential for civil society to work effectively, is not simply a result of
state acquiescence. As the dangerous divisions in Mitrovica, Kosovo, testify, these
freedoms did not exist after the UN assumed control of the province. The mar-
ket economy was not strong enough to prevent aberrations in media ownership,
and the failures of civil society tended to be both mirrored and perpetuated in the
press. Civil society, like the economy, was more akin to a gaseous cloud trying to
form into a mass while random elements drove its actions one way or the other.
In such contexts, attempts to regulate the media should be evaluated as a method
of forming this mass into an effective element of democracy, one that promotes
true freedoms and is able to fulfill its role vis-à-vis the other institutions.
The most dramatic example of ill-assisted media is, of course, the case of
Rwanda. There, an internationally-supported pseudo-private station, Radio-
Television Libre des Milles Collines, forged a propaganda machine that played on
Hutu fears of the former Tutsi elite, creating a distorted and inflammatory ver-
sion of the history of relations between the two groups. This contributed to the
genocide of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Snyder & Ballentine 1996).
It is impossible to evaluate precisely the effect of this propaganda. But accord-
ing to Holly Burkhalter, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch,
“jamming the hate radio was the action that, in retrospect, might have done the
most to save Rwandan lives” (Burkhalter 1994-95). Amazingly, the radios were
instead allowed to withdraw from the advancing Tutsi army into the safe area of
the French Army zone, where they continued to broadcast. NGOs such as
Human Rights Watch and Africa Rights, along with many independent schol-
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11. The state and the rule of law would normally limit life-threatening speech in civil society. Also,
for example, civil society and political society would use their powers to address abuses and corrup-
tion in the state apparatus. For more examples of the interplay, see Linz & Stepan (1996).
ars, concluded that the international community needs to encourage Rwanda
and Burundi to democratize, to foster an independent press, and to bring the
perpetrators of genocide to justice (Burkhalter 1994-95). Upon closer inspec-
tion, it becomes obvious that their prescriptions contradict their own analyses of
the causes of the Rwandan genocide. NGOs continue to advocate precisely those
measures that their analyses have demonstrated triggered the killings, i.e. an
increase in political pluralism and the promotion of an anti-government media.12
Analyzing the situation in Burundi, Reporters sans Frontières, for example, now
warns that the “error committed in Rwanda in the name of the principle of the
liberty of the press must not be repeated in Burundi.” 
What lessons have been learned from the dramatic examples of Rwanda,
Bosnia and Kosovo?
5. Conclusions on moral responsibility of democracy assistants
Kosovo was unfortunately a good example of an entirely unregulated province.
When the UN took over its administration, the province completely lacked gov-
ernmental structures, and its judicial system was non-existent. (There was fierce
debate as to which set of laws should be applicable in Kosovo, the one from before
1990 or the Yugoslav one applied to the province by the Milosevic regime.) Most
Serb judges had fled the province while Albanian judges had not worked in their
profession for the preceding ten years. Furthermore, political society was virtual-
ly non-existent, as elections were organized only in November 2000 (local ones),
while Kosovo-wide suffrage was planned for the fall of 2001. 
Civil society also remined very weak. The media was in a state of absolute
chaos: as noted, almost 100 pirate stations mushroomed throughout Kosovo in
the first year after the war at a time when no broadcast or press laws were in place
(other than the old Yugoslav information law of dubious human rights value).
Even self-regulation was non-existent since, as discussed above, the association
of Kosovar Journalists was inactive, notwithstanding the support and pressures
of outside actors for the creation of a self-regulatory media regime. Previous
mistakes continue to be repeated—the creation of large numbers of private
broadcast stations and a vigorous print media continues to be seen as a positive
indication of admirable commitments by donors who recognize the importance of
the media in consolidating new democracies. In my opinion, the Kosovar example
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12. These inconsistencies can easily be seen if one compares Africa Rights, “Rwanda”, pp. 32-34 with
p. 720 or Des Forges “Rwandan Crisis” pp. 1,9 (from Snyder and Ballentine, 1996). 
clearly demonstrates that a coherent donor strategy and proper timing continue
to be lacking.
The professional level of reporting was poor following the conflict in
Kosovo. With the exception of one or two daily papers, slander and hate
speech flourished in the local press, and people were defamed in an arbitrary
manner. Frustrated by the inaction of the judiciary, Albanian journalists cre-
ated their own justice by publishing letters from the public denouncing alleged
(this word however never appeared in the articles) “war criminals, ostensibly
walking on the streets of Kosovar towns unpunished” and offering their names
and addresses.13
Responsibility for the final outcome of democracy assistance does not belong
exclusively in the hands of international organizations who craft policy, such as
the UN or the OSCE. The picture of ‘good’ donors and ‘bad’ international orga-
nizations in charge of policymaking in developing countries is no longer sus-
tainable.
Governmental organizations create laws, but donors giving support to indi-
vidual media outlets have a dramatic impact on building the Fourth Estate in an
organized manner. However, as much as they may hope to, donors do not act
independently, but in context.
Instead of supporting numerical pluralism of the media, they should concen-
trate on its quality and on building professionalism among journalists, making
sure that—preferably in concert with international organizations—what hap-
pened in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is not repeated.
Unfortunately, most donors are more concerned with quick final evalua-
tions and tangible results than with difficult-to-measure, overall ‘quality of
democracy’ benchmarks which are visible only years later. It is far easier to
write in their final reports that they have established a radio station, provided
studio and transmission equipment, and trained journalists for three days. As
Carothers (1999) puts it, “the evaluation tail often wags the programme dog”.
Long and often boring trainings of journalists, persistence in setting up jour-
nalists’ associations, and the drive to ensure that professional ethics are upheld
are far more important in the long run than creating 100 stations of which less
than half will survive economically once the donors pull out due to shifting
interests.
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13. Lazar Selimi of the Institute of War and Peace Reporting said of the standards of Kosovar report-
ing “they are not seeing any alleged Serb war criminals sentenced, and the mentality of the people is
that someone who has committed crimes should be punished. They think it is morally right at a time
when we’re not seeing results from the international community”. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/eng-
lish/world/europe/newsid_752000/752692.stm.
Democracy assistance is an art, not a science. Over ten years of joint efforts
by various international organizations, foundations and private sources have
undoubtedly14 contributed enormously to democracy assistance in the post-
communist countries of Eastern Europe. Although there is no plausible
method to measure the effects of such activities on the democratic develop-
ment of the assisted country, it is now clear that some strategies are more effi-
cient and effective than others. However, some strategies can be deleterious if
not well timed.
This is also true in constructing a democratic media. I believe that it is more
important to build the institutional basis for the media to function properly than
to emphasize numerical pluralism as an indication of success. This means a need
for professionalism, self-regulatory mechanisms, strong associations driven in
their activities by professional ethics, and good laws protecting both journalists
from abuses by politicians as well as politicians and citizens from arbitrary accu-
sations by journalists.
Experience from Bosnia and Rwanda showed that, in the absence of the prop-
erly functioning five arenas, unregulated media may be dangerous and can
encourage, rather than calm, nationalistic tendencies. International organiza-
tions in charge of policymaking should consider temporary control over the
media, in concert with donors, in order to prevent what happened in these coun-
tries, while strategically working on preparing the basis for a truly democratic
Fourth Estate.
Before offering policy recommendations for the future, I would like to point
out that an additional aspect of this subject should be further analyzed—a meta-
policy analysis is needed consisting of empirical research aimed at establishing
whether and when policy advice itself tends to be followed with regard to the
media. This could help guide policymakers in focusing their practical recom-
mendations on successful solutions. Such a study would also assess the role that
internal and external politics play in certain contexts and propose ways of miti-
gating their effects. I hope to be able to carry out such research to support these
conclusions and increase the scope of this work in the future.
6. Recommendations
There are three central problems for which I will recommend solutions in
this chapter: 
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14. But here again, how does one measure such an ineffable quantity?
First, the dangers of poorly planned assistance to the development of the Fourth
Estate in post-conflict areas, which may cause an outburst of ethnic conflict rather
than fostering peaceful cohabitation.
Second, the reasons why international organizations in charge of media regu-
lation and development in the Balkans have been largely ineffective.
Third, strategies to help donors avoid waste, duplication and few results.
6.1. Phase 1: Set up phase 
From the outset of a mission, it is essential that international administrations
assert authority over all media sources and establish clear and meaningful bench-
marks for the relaxation of such authority over time. The media must receive
equal attention as other areas of international concern, and must not be sub-
sumed within other divisions. Media policy and development should be separate
from press/public information. In order to be successful and efficient, regulation
and reform should not be separated from other media development and policy
activities.15
The importance of a good assessment of the local situation is surprisingly
underestimated. International organizations which establish missions in a post-
conflict country should take their time to evaluate the situation on the ground.
There are obstacles involved: international organizations such as the UN,
OSCE and EU are not single entities but rather conglomerations of govern-
ments and governmental delegations which are often not willing to wait for a
thorough assessment. Considering their significant financial expenditures,
they understandably want to see immediate and tangible effects. Headquarters
in New York, Vienna or Brussels require satisfactory reports on measurable
results achieved in the field to justify their often controversial budget propos-
al for the coming year.
While the initial set up phase is fraught with political pressures for quantifi-
able results, missions and governments alike should attempt to remain focused
on the substantive and often invisible work carried out at this step which is the
key to later success. The initial assessment phase should ideally consist of the fol-
lowing elements: 
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15. These recommendations were included in the policy paper for media in Kosovo by the Experts’
Group, July 1999.
Media development issues:
• Identify the most dynamic and valuable local media actors (journalists or
managers) worth supporting. This can be accomplished by dispatching a group
of investigators familiar with the local language (though not from the area), and
by organizing large meetings of local media representatives—at this point, any-
one defining themselves as ‘journalists’.
• Commission a reputable agency to conduct a series of public opinion sur-
veys regarding audience preferences for broadcast and print media. This rather
costly initiative may be achieved through the establishment of a donor’s infor-
mation exchange network and the creation of a commonly shared database and
would, in the end, be extremely cost-effective. Needless to say, such surveys
should be conducted periodically in order to provide both donors and interna-
tional organizations with updated information regarding the local audience and
give the policymakers better direction regarding the most effective strategy.
• Assist in the creation of a journalistic association to establish a self-regula-
tory mechanism, preferably with financial support for a great deal of journalistic,
normative and legal training as well as salary support for key actors. Low salaries
will decrease the perceived prestige and interest of those most qualified who will
naturally search for alternative means of employment from the outset.16 As the
Kosovar example has shown, it is essential to nurture a lively journalistic com-
munity aware of its own interests. Professional institutions such as the
International Federation of Journalists should be involved in the process early on.
• Assess the need for journalist protection while evaluating the level of jour-
nalistic professionalism and training needs. A good analysis of the situation
regarding minority media must also be a component of the initial needs assess-
ment, particularly if one accepts the idea that media pluralism is a necessary con-
dition for democracy. 
Media regulatory issues:
• Analyze the old regime’s laws on public information and, if in contradiction
with international human rights, work on a strategy for the immediate suspen-
sion of the relevant provisions. A review of other laws affecting media and the
provision public information should also be conducted. 
128
16. Usually in places where the international community ends up administering a country territory,
the elite personnel resources tend to dry up very quickly. Understandably, the economic situation in
such places is likely to be unfavorable and it is difficult to find dedicated volunteers for this, at least
initially, full-time work.
Technical issues:
• Assess the damage to transmission sites and equipment during the conflict.
Transmission sites, post, and telecom offices are often among the first targets of
any war. Technical damage to towers, transmitters, buildings etc. should be eval-
uated if there is a recognized need for delivering objective, nationwide informa-
tion aimed at preventing a backslide into conflict. 
Political issues:
• Before donors find pet projects—a situation which inevitably leads to a
strong atmosphere of mistrust and a lack of credibility—international organiza-
tions must make their policy decisions quickly and convincingly, insist on adher-
ing to that strategy, and not lose momentum.
6.2. Phase 2: Implementation 
Media development issues:
• Based on specific suggestions from all involved parties regarding appropri-
ate funding and structures, a public service broadcaster should be established imme-
diately under the authority of the international organization in charge of media.
Claims to ownership, property or employment by an incumbent national broad-
caster should not be recognized.17
• International news services such as the BBC, DW, RFI and VOA should
expand their coverage of developments within the country by broadcasting a
local-language version of their programme.18
• There is no need for a UN radio station, which would deplete the limited
pool of skilled journalists and divert international support from other, more
compelling projects. The UN’s public messages can be conveyed through the
above-mentioned public service broadcaster.19
• In parallel with the establishment of a public service broadcaster, efforts
must be made from the outset to develop a domestic professional, non-partisan
news agency.
• Close cooperation between organizations in charge of policymaking and
donors is vitally important. While difficult, once reciprocal trust is established
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17. This recommendation was included in the original policy paper by the Group of Experts, supra note.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
between donors and local contacts, it is essential that donors do not abandon pro-
jects. Unfortunately, the unsustainable approach of toccata e fuga is frequently adopt-
ed. Donors often believe that giving money to start up a radio station or a newspa-
per is enough, while organizations in charge of regulation are often faced with
recurring editorial abuse or hate speech. Responsible donors must be concerned
about the behavior of their ‘protégés’ while support is provided as well as subse-
quently, and this can be accomplished, for example, by ensuring the provision of
professional training. International organizations in charge of policymaking should
provide donors with regular information necessary to fulfill their role successfully.
• In order to get a sense of the complete media development picture or ‘pack-
age’, donors should establish an information-exchange network, particularly in
cases where donors specialize in a specific field (technical support, professional
training, legal responsibility, improvement of management skills, etc.).
Unfortunately, many donors nurture their own ‘babies’ without wishing to share
the glory of the final creation with others. Given that some donors work better
and faster than others and the burden of having to adhere to a ‘production chain’
mentality may slow down the whole process, this behavior is understandable.
However, the creation of coalitions of donors who know and trust each other
could go a long way toward solving this problem.
• Never promise the impossible and raise false expectations. Promising finan-
cial assistance to the private media is easy and may have good initial outcomes
(in attracting broader media attention and identifying who is ‘out there’ and wor-
thy of support, for example). False hopes inspire a grateful and faithful public,
but not for long. Like the phenomenon of ‘donor fatigue’ when donors’ money
and enthusiasm evaporates (commonly seen when there is another political cri-
sis in the region), ‘recipient fatigue’ may be even more dangerous. Inefficiency
or delays in the release of funds and unfulfilled promises of support can be detri-
mental to overall trust and respect between the two or more parties. A pragmat-
ic approach is far more effective in maintaining credibility.
• Donors should keep in touch with policymakers to better understand actu-
al local media problems. Although late, this was eventually accomplished in
Kosovo. This recommendation applies particularly to governments that often
appropriate significant amounts of money and seek to dictate political strategy.
Media regulatory issues:
• The measures outlined above should also involve assistance to ensure that
established legal procedures are followed. Too often, donors concentrate solely on
providing stations with equipment without bothering to help them apply for a
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license. Of course, the fact that stations must apply for a license should be empha-
sized and understood clearly by all local media outlets. The OSCE in Kosovo was
repeatedly faced with complaints made by donor governments that a radio or tele-
vision station had not received a license. Financial support should be accompanied
by logistic support, and it should be clearly understood that financial backing given
to a station does not waive its legal obligations. Donors themselves are often not
entirely clear about the regulations that they need to become familiar with.
• The media regulatory agency or organization temporarily in charge should
either open an information office or hold regular meetings both with broadcast-
ers and interested donors to train and inform broadcasters about their duties as
well as their rights.
• Potentially controversial decisions should be implemented immediately
from the outset. In some countries where conflict was fuelled by ethnic hatred
(e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo) an initial ‘hard hand’ on the media
may be necessary to stop further incitement of violence. Temporary and emer-
gency measures such as a hate speech regulation, applicable to both the print
press and broadcast media, may be necessary to keep the fragile peace under
control. However, such measures should only be implemented at the very ini-
tial phase of the mission when journalistic self-regulation is largely absent.
• As far as licensing procedures are concerned, most transition and virtually
all post-conflict countries experience a significant proliferation of small broad-
casters. In order to encourage some broadcasters to concentrate on the produc-
tion of high quality programming, donors should encourage promising candi-
dates to act as production houses and sell their programming to existing private
stations or the nationwide public service media rather than support the emer-
gence of further radio and television stations. This solution may be considerably
valued in countries or regions with multi-ethnic societies, where freedom of
movement is limited and access to information about the events ‘on the other
side’ are seriously obstructed or even non-existant. The purchase of education-
al, cultural or even entertainment programs from local producers would also be
an advantage for a public often subjected to low-quality, largely foreign pro-
gramming (MTV is ubiquitous). In short, a more diversified and higher quality
service could be offered. Furthermore, as the media situation stabilizes and copy-
right and other legal market norms take hold, the demand for programming will
rise as stations drop out of the glutted marketplace.
• It is essential to involve the local community to the maximum degree pos-
sible and, in particular, various media interest groups (especially associations
of journalists and broadcasters) in any decision that regards the future of the
media in their country: for example, licensing procedures, broadcast and press
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laws, codes of conduct, etc. Credibility and consensus will be much easier to
obtain if the local community feels involved. The creation of an advisory body
consisting of well-respected members of the local community can be tremen-
dously beneficial and particularly useful in avoiding the perception that poli-
cymakers are ‘colonialists’. This advisory body will help prevent costly deci-
sions that are unworkable due to the specific cultural context. 
• Absolute transparency of decisions including policymaking, legal work,
licensing and potential sanctions is essential. The local community has to be
involved in every step of the process of building a democratic media to better
conceptualize the ultimate democratic goal.
Technical issues:
• Specific donations should be well reasoned and wisely allocated. Donors
often contribute very sophisticated studio or transmission equipment to the
media, which cannot be used due to a lack of staff training or an inability to pro-
vide adequate maintenance. Sometimes older equipment with which broadcast-
ers are familiar is preferable to expensive digital technology that is too expensive
to maintain and too difficult to use without advanced and specialized training.
Furthermore, spare parts for such equipment are expensive and often difficult to
obtain, which may put them beyond the reach of most small broadcasters.
6.3. Phase 3: Capacity Building
• Institution-building efforts that improve and strengthen key institutions
should be a major objective of any program seeking to better guarantee the suc-
cess of reforms in transition countries. The training of local staff and the grad-
ual transferring of power to local authorities, or ‘nationalization’, is a necessary
element of institution-building (take the example of the IMC in Bosnia, which
after two years is almost entirely nationalized). This logic is generally applied by
large international organizations but should not be ignored by smaller interna-
tionally supported NGOs. The first year should be devoted to the intensive
training of local staff, the establishment of a good working relationship with
other organizations involved in similar fields, and the procurement of necessary
technical equipment.
• The ‘train the trainer’ approach is essential in creating self-sustainable
structures and initiatives.
• One of the most important recommendations for donors is not to abandon
projects. It is preferable to give small but consistent donations rather than one
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large, lump sum grant. Media outlets in post-conflict areas can be easily hijacked
by local Mafias, strong governments, or nationalistic trends as the political tide
dictates. Donors too often shift their interests to other areas and lose contact
with previous projects. It is only when the regulatory agency sanctions or refus-
es to license an initially donor-supported radio or television station due to vio-
lations of local regulations that the donors become active again and sometimes
react aggressively on the governmental level. Economic support requires respon-
sibility. Donors should let recipients know that they are informed about activi-
ties and that their support is conditional upon cooperative attitudes and profes-
sionalism. Keeping track of the behavior of recipients is obviously in the inter-
est of the donor, as the beneficiaries tend to use the names of their patrons as a
legitimizing factor when problems arise. Donors must recognize that their sup-
port also carries with it the perception of tacit cooperation, which may color
their own reputation. From the perspective of the regulatory agencies, experi-
ence has shown that no sanction has as much leverage as a warning call from
donors. Close and trustful cooperation between donors and regulatory agencies
is essential.
• International organizations and donors should appreciate the importance
of training in the grant-writing process. Nowadays, these courses are a common
tool of survival at every university. The capacity to write a successful application,
plan a budget, and propose a project have become essential skills. In considering
grants, donors should be mindful of the fact that the undeveloped economy of
the assisted country may not be able to sustain as high a level of media activity as
the donor may expect.
• Never ruin the local job market by paying the local staff more than medi-
an national salaries. It was a common practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo for the international community to attract local staff by paying
extremely high wages, making professionals such as doctors, engineers, lawyers,
and public prosecutors quit their jobs in the public sector to work as language
assistants, security guards, or even drivers. There is a need for more coordina-
tion between those organizations that raise salary levels in their hunt for well-
educated individuals and the organizations originally employing these profes-
sionals. If capacity building is a real concern for the international community,
it should avoid such unfair competition and aim for long-term and targeted
training to provide locals with sustainable positions.
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